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Abstract. This article presents industrial experience of validating large data sets 
against specification written using the B / Event-B mathematical language and 
the ProB model checker.  
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1   Introduction 
Historically, the B Method [1] was introduced in the late 80’s to design correctly safe 
software. Promoted and supported by RATP1, B and Atelier B, the tool implementing 
it, have been successfully applied to the industry of transportation. Figure 1 depicts 
the worldwide implementations of the B technology for safety critical software, 
mainly as automatic train controllers for metros. Today, Alstom Transport 
Information Solutions, Siemens Transportation Systems and Technicatome-Areva are 
the main actors in the development of B safety-critical software. They share a 
product-based strategy and reuse as much as possible existing B models to develop 
future metros.  
In the mid ‘90s Event-B [2] enlarged the scope of B to analyse, study and specify 
not only software, but also whole systems. Event-B has been influenced by the work 
done earlier on Action Systems [13] by the Finnish School (Action System however 
remained an academic project). Event-B is the synthesis between B and Action 
System. It extends the usage of B to systems that might contain software but also 
hardware and pieces of equipment. In that respect, one of the outcome of Event-B is 
the proved definition of systems architectures and, more generally, the proved 
development of, so called, “system studies” [7][8][9][10][11], which are performed 
before the specification and design of the software. This enlargement allows one to 
perform failure studies right from the beginning in a large system development. 
Event-B has been used to perform system level safety studies in the Railways [12], 
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allowing to formally verify part of the whole system specification, hence contributing 
to improve the overall level of confidence of the railways system being built.  
 
Fig. 1. Worldwide implementations (2012) of systems embedding software generated from B 
models. 
 
However, if the verification of Event-B system specification or B software 
specification is quite easily reachable by semi-automated proof2, verifying embedded 
data against properties3 may turn out to be a nightmare in case of large data sets. For 
the Meteor metro (line 14, Paris), software and data were kept together in a B project 
[5]. Demonstrating data correctness regarding expected properties was really difficult 
as it requires to iterate over large sets of variables and constants (and their domains) 
and the Atelier B main theorem prover4 is not designed for this activity [6], that 
requires more a model checker or constraint solver rather than a theorem prover. Later 
on, software and data started to be developed and validated within two different 
processes, in order to avoid a new compilation if the data are modified but not the 
software.  Data validation started to be entirely human, leading to painful, error-
prone, long-term activities (usually more than six months to manually check 100 000 
data against 200 rules) 
 
In this article, we present a formal approach, based on the B/Event-B mathematical 
language and the ProB model checker and constraint solver, designed and 
experimented by Alstom Transport Information Solutions for the validation of 
railways data. 
 
                                                          
2 Automatic theorem provers usually demonstrate 90-95 % of « well written” B models, the 
remaining has to be demonstrated during interactive sessions with the tool. 
3 In the case of a metro, these data may represent the topology of the tracks, the position of the 
signals, switches, etc. 
4 That is used by both Atelier B and Rodin platform 
2   The Genesis 
Verifying railways systems covers many aspects and requires a large number of cross-
verifications, performed by a wide range of actors including the designer of the 
system, the company in charge of its exploitation, the certification body, etc. Even if 
complete automation is not possible, any automatic verification is welcome as it helps 
to improve the overall level of confidence. Indeed a railways system is a collection of 
highly dependent sub-system specification and these dependencies need to be 
checked. They may be based on railways signalling rules (that are specific to every 
country or even every company in a single country), on rolling stock features 
(constant or variable train size or configuration) and exploitation conditions.  
In France, AQL RATP laboratory initiated the development of a generic tool, 
OVADO5, to verify trackside data for the metro line 1 in Paris that is being 
automated6. This tool, based on the PredicateB predicate evaluator7, is able to parse 
data (XML, csv or text-based formats), load rules and verify that data complies with 
rules. Initially tested on line 13 configuration data, the tool has been able to check 400 
definitions and 125 rules in 5 minutes. In Fig 2, we see on the left a data (called 
E_a_trainDynamicDeparture_minimum_speed) that associates to a train (refered to by 
an integer index) its minimum speed (a floating point value). It is declared as a total 
function, indexes and minimum speed being reachable in an excel file (A7 containing 
the first index and AM7 the first minimum speed). On the right, a named property is 
described in natural and in mathematical languages. This property may refer to data 
previously defined. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of data definition and property 
 
However the PredicateB tool is just a calculator able to manipulate B/Event-B 
mathematical language predicates: it is not able to find all possible values for any 
non-deterministic substitution or to find all counter-examples. Moreover the way the 
errors are displayed may lead to difficult analysis when the faulty predicate is 
complex. 
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6 A specific tool, initially developed for validating line 14 data, representing more than 300 000 
lines of C++ code, was too difficult to maintain and to adapt to other lines. It was not reused 
for other lines. 
7 Hosted by the Rodin SVN Sourceforge service (http://rodin-b-sharp.svn.sourceforge.net) 
During the DEPLOY project8, the University of Düsseldorf and Siemens 
Transportation Systems have elaborated a new approach, based on the ProB model 
checker to dramatically reduce validation duration from about six months to some 
minutes [3][4]. Data is extracted from ADA source code and properties come from B 
models. In the case of the San Juan project, 79 files with a total of 23,000 lines of B 
are parsed to extract 226 properties and 147 assertions. The verification took 1017 
seconds and led to the discovery of 4 false formulas. ProB was then experimented 
with great success on several projects: Roissy Charles de Gaule airport shuttle, 
Barcelona line 9, San Paulo line 4, Paris line 1 and Algiers line 1. At that occasion, 
ProB was slightly improved in order to deal with large scale problems and well 
validated in order to ease its acceptance by a certification body. However analysing 
false properties remains difficult. In Fig 3, a failed invariant is listed on the left (the 
one that is rewritten as false) while the counterexample is shown on the right (the 
values used for the data that lead to the breaking of the invariant). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. A false property and its graphical representation 
 
3 DTVT 
Alstom Transport Information Solutions decided to experiment a new approach by 
reusing successful features of previous experiments. A new tool, DTVT, is defined 
and implemented. Its structure is presented in figure 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. DTVT tool structure 
                                                          
8 http://www.deploy-project.eu/ 
Input data is in csv format. Data items are identified through their container file 
and their name. For example, Curvatures_Cap!BeginValueCm refers to the variable 
BeginValueCm  in the file Curvatures_Cap.xls (see figure 5). 
 
Fig. 5. Example of data declaration 
 
Supported basic types are INT, BOOL and STRING. Data items are sequences of 
these basic types. Values are extracted from xls files (see figure 6, the positions are 
expressed in centimeters). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Example of data valuation 
 
The verification rules are expressed using the B mathematical language and structured 
as B operations. Instead of having to deal with too large, quantified predicates, a 
verification rule is decomposed in small steps that allow displaying accurate error 
message helping to determine the source of the error.  
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Example of a verification rule 
 
A rule is composed of one or several COUNTEREXAMPLEs. 
COUNTEREXAMPLEs are evaluated in the order they are defined. Keyword 
COUNTEREXAMPLE is followed by a formatted message (%1, %2, %3, etc. 
represent the value of the first, second, third parameter of the following ANY 
substitution).  
The ANY substitution allows to filter data or to calculate values. In figure 7, the first 
rule computes the number of couples of the sequence ATC_Equipment_Type whose 
second element is the string “Trackside OMAP”. 
The ANY substitution is followed by an EXPECTED field. If some values of the 
parameters of the ANY substitution satisfy the predicate of that substitution but don’t 
satisfy the predicate of the EXPECTED field, the error message is displayed with its 
parameters instantiated. In figure 7, the error message of the second rule displays the 
value of urbalisSectorID (%1) and nb (%3). 
 
ProB is the central tool for the verification. It has been modified in order to produce a 
file containing all counter examples detected (see figure 5) and slightly improved to 
better support some B keywords. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Example of faulty verification: meaningful messages are generated for all 
counter examples 
 
 
DTVT has been experimented with success on several ongoing developments 
(Mexico, Toronto, Sao Paulo, and Panama) to verify up to 50,000 Excel cells against 
up to 200 rules. A first round allowed defining required concepts, intermediate 
constructs (predicates used by several rules) and formalizing a set of generic rules that 
are shared by all projects. During the next rounds, specific project rules and data files 
were added. A complete verification is performed in about 10 minutes, including the 
verification report. The process is completely automatic and can be replayed without 
any human intervention when data values are modified. 
5 Conclusion 
Data validation appears to be of paramount importance in safety critical systems. The 
results obtained in this domain during the DEPLOY project have allowed to create 
and experiment with success on real scale projects a method for validating data 
against properties, based on the ProB model-checker and constraint solver. 
 
References 
1. Abrial, J.R. (1996) , The B-book: Assigning programs to meanings, Cambridge University 
Press   
2. Abrial, J.R (2005)., Rigorous Open Development Environment for Complex Systems: event 
B language 
3. Leuschel, Michael and Falampin, Jérôme and Fabian, Fritz and Daniel, Plagge (2009),  
Automated Property Verification for Large Scale B Models. In: Proceedings FM 2009. 
Springer-Verlag. 
4. Michael Leuschel (2012), Formal Mind, ProB, ProR and Data Validation with B, FM’2012, 
Industray Day. 
5. Patrick Behm , Paul Benoit , Alain Faivre , Jean-marc Meynadier (1999) , Météor: A 
Successful Application of B in a Large Project 
6. Milonnet C. (1999) , B Validation Book; Internal document ref (Matra Transport 
International) 
7. Sabatier, D. & al (2008), FDIR Strategy Validation with the B method, DASIA 2008 
8. Hoffmann, S. & al (2007), The B Method for the Construction of Micro-Kernel Based 
Systems, ZB 2007 
9. Sabatier, D. & al (2006), Use of the Formal B Method for a SIL3 System Landing Door 
Commands for line 13 of the Paris subway, Lambda Mu 15 
10. Lecomte, T.  (2008), Safe and Reliable Metro Platform Screen Doors Control/Command 
Systems, FM 2008 
11. Lecomte, T. & al (2007), Formal Methods in Safety Critical Railway Systems, SBMF 2007 
12.Sabatier, D., Formal proofs for the NYCT line 7 (Flushing) modernization project, DEPLOY 
Industry Day, Fontainebleau (2012) 
13.Back, R.J. & al (1991), Stepwise Refinement of Action Systems, Structured Programming 
#12 p17-30 (Springer verlag ed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
